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The book does an outstanding job of outlining the history of the accident and highlighting 
the problems associated with and that were contributing factors to the crash of Air France Flt 447.  
The two authors have a wealth of aviation-related experience.  However, an uninformed individual 
reading the book might not be able to put everything together to realize the driving factors behind 
the decisions that were made that caused this accident.  The one area that is not clearly stated in 
the book is that the force behind the business decisions that were contributing causes are 
money/profits, airlines operate on a calculated risk bases, probabilities.  Aircraft 
configuration/equipment and flight crew training are centered upon the airworthiness authority 
requirement standards which are considered the minimum required.  Airlines normally just meet 
the minimum standards.  System safety analysis could be used in more detail to eliminate some of 
these problems from the design/manufacture to the training of the operators.  
  
   The causes of this accident could be grouped into five main areas that were highlighted 
within the book as contributing factors to the accident:  1) regulatory problems; 2) manufacturing 
shortcomings; 3) Air France shortcomings; 4) pilot experience/training problems; and 5) search 
and rescue problems (not involved in the cause of the accident). 
 
     It is apparent from the information provided that this accident could have been 
prevented from an operational standpoint.  Air France could have taken near-term actions from the 
perspective of flight crew training, installing self-contained attitude indicators/angle of attack 
indicators and by communicating to Air France flight crew members previous similar Air France 
problems associated with pitot icing and actions to take in case of pitot icing that caused this crash.  
Knowledge is power. The regulatory airworthiness authorities had earlier recognized a problem 
with the Thales pitot system and could have taken actions to mandate pitot tube changes as a 
priority item instead of allowing airlines to make the changes on an as-required basis.  The two 
above actions could have reduced the potential of this accident happening at a modest expense. 
 
Air France was remiss from the standpoint of pilot pairings.  Flight hours themselves do 
not necessarily denote experience, in today’s world of automation, a pilot can accumulate 
thousands of flight hours but still not be experienced from a hands-on flying aspect.  Air France 
should not pair two first officers with one Captain; the different pairing would provide a higher 
degree of safety.  From a human factors standpoint, one cannot expect a Captain to be in a rest 
period/sleep and suddenly be called into the cockpit to resolve a severe out-of-control situation.  
The Captain was placed into a perfect human factors dilemma of loss of situational awareness  
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where he did not have sufficient time or cues to understand all that had happened to the aircraft or 
what was occurring to cause the problem. The visual cues were not available to provide this 
information in a timely manner because of the lack of instrumentation that could have been solved 
with the inclusion of a self-contained attitude indicator and angle of attack indicator.  These two 
devices would have provided an experienced, trained pilot with the visual cues needed to recognize 
that the aircraft was in a stall condition and actions required for recovery. 
 
Another area that is very important and must be evaluated is flight crew training.  Many 
pilots entering the industry have minimal experience in partial panel flying or angle of attack 
interpretation in relation to flight and stalls.  In this accident scenario, two of the pilots had limited 
experience associated with angle of attack flying and partial panel flying.  Pilots must be trained 
on the value of understanding angle of attack of an aircraft in relationship to stalls and the value 
of flying angle of attack only.  A pilot must be trained and knowledgeable to recognize stall 
conditions and stall recovery procedures. 
 
Questions that apply to this accident that should be addressed: 1) Is flight crew training 
sufficient in today environment; 2) are aircraft becoming too automated, are they smarter than the 
flight crew that operate them; 3) should airworthiness authorities be more proactive in setting 
minimum standards; 4) are airlines shortcutting safety to increase profitability (items 3 and 4 are 
interrelated)? The situation that happened in his accident was pre-ordained, it was not a case of 
“if” but “when.” Blame can be assessed across a broad spectrum of organizations, from the 
airworthiness authorities, manufacturers, airlines and flight crew training.  One fact that is a driver 
and must be remembered is that an airline is a business and the goal of every business is 
profitability.  Decisions are based upon profit making. This book is an excellent rundown on the 
accident; I would recommend that all aviation professionals read this book. 
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